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This paper discusses a cryptographic protocol to evaluate an andgate such that
a party can keep his or her input bit secret from the other party
 Such a protocol
is of interest	 because it can be generalized to any logical circuit for any number
of participants
 A formal statement of this generalization reads as follows n
participants want to compute together a function f x
 
 x

  x
n
 with x
i
being
their inputs nobody wants to reveal information about his or her input except
what can be logically be deduced from ones input and the output
 The paper
contains no new results but provides an illustration of a subeld of cryptography	
and describes several interesting protocols and protocol design techniques

  Introduction
Suppose Alice and Bob meet for the rst time They both want to nd out
whether they are interested in each other so both engage in a cryptographic
protocol transmitted in infrared through their watches The protocol has
to be such that if both parties show interest they nd out but if one party
isnt he or she cannot nd out whether the other person was interested This
problem called the matchmaking problem was raised by David Stodolsky a
social scientist with strong interest in privacy protection when he visited the
CWI a few months after the Crypto Course was held
Personally I never understood how a cryptographic protocol could be of
any help in solving the matchmaking problem I had visions of Alice and
Bob nervously fumbling their watches though this is just an implementation
problem some people expect that in the future humans will have an infrared
sensor implanted 		
 But what about one partys Ha Just checking Ciao
or the less subtle Mmm now that I have come closer I change my mind
There is no penalty for defecting as game theorists would say

But still the matchmaking problem was extremely relevant because it is
just a disguised form of an evaluation of an andgate in which the input of
a party is kept secret except from what can be inferred from the output If
this problem were solved it could lead to solving the generalized problem of
evaluating any Boolean circuit consisting of and and notgates For many
encryption schemes it was clear how to implement a notgate but the and
gate formed the bottleneck
Around that time protocols existed for some specic problems like the mil
lionaires problem 	
 two millionaires want to nd out who is richest without
revealing their wealth how to play poker 	
 
 and how to hold secure
elections 
 These protocols take advantage of special algebraic properties of
the encryption schemes used Also ZeroKnowledge had just been dened 

and people were coming up with protocols in which Alice can convince Bob
that she knows a satisfying assignment for any Boolean circuit    	

Note that in these kind of protocols only one party provides an input to the
circuit which makes it easier to handle than the matchmaking problem
Around  the rst solutions to the matchmaking problem and its gener
alizations began to appear resulting in a true avalanche of papers in subsequent
years To see why let us rst state the generalization of the matchmaking
problem in a more formal way
Private MultiParty Computation pmpc
n participants want to compute together a function fx
 
 x

  x
n
 with x
i
being their inputs Nobody wants to reveal information about his input except
what can be logically deduced from the output y
Clearly this problem can be solved if a party trusted by all n participants
like a judge or notary public is present everybody just hands his input to
this trusted party who does the computation and announces the result The
question is to obtain the same functionality without a trusted party under the
assumption that participants are connected through some transmission channel
The function f can be a randomized function participants can provide a
random string as part of their input When f takes the exclusiveor xor
of n random bits one provided by each participant a trusted random bit is
obtained when at least one participant is honest Furthermore everybody can
learn the output string y Private output can be obtained when f considers
the random input string of a participant as a private key and xors parts of
the resulting string y using this key
Observe that all the aforementioned protocols millionaires poker voting
are special instances of pmpc and many other cryptographic problems can
be expressed this way For instance in mutual identication 
 two parties
want to verify they possess the same string This can be expressed as a private
computation of fx
 
 x

  x
 
  x


 where   denotes logical identity
Protocols for pmpc have been studied extensively at the end of the s and
have several aliases like secure or secret distributed computation or oblivious
	
circuit evaluation To do justice to all the researchers that contributed to this
problem is beyond the scope of this paper for a more detailed overview see

 But let us briey sketch four issues involved underlying assumptions
protocol structure security properties and resources needed
Any protocol for pmpc needs an assumption in order to work two dishonest
parties with unrestricted computational resources cannot engage in a meaning
ful cryptographic protocol Broadly speaking we can distinguish three types
of assumptions
Participants are computational restricted Protocols for pmpc can be constructed
if we assume that all the participants have only restricted computational
resources and that computationally hard problems exist Here the hard
problem can be of a specic nature and possess specic algebraic prop
erties that makes the protocol implementation easier many of the earlier
solutions were of this kind   
 Some protocols used the more gen
eral assumption that oneway functions exist 
 g is a oneway function
if g is easy to compute whereas g
  
is hard to compute if P  NP then
oneway functions cannot exist
The majority of participants are honest If we assume that a reliable broadcast
channel exists that each pair of participants has a private communication
channel and that at least


n later improved to
 

n participants are honest
then there exist protocols for multiparty computations   	 	 
 All
these protocols are based on secret sharing schemes in which a participants
breaks his secret in n  shares which he gives to the others These secret
sharing schemes have the property that a certain quorum is needed to
reconstruct the secret from the shares but a smaller number of dishonest
participants can gain no information about the secret
Participants are connected by errorprone channels Usually we assume that
when two participants communicate the transmission of bits is errorless
a bit sent by one party equals the bit received by the other In practice
errorcorrecting codes are applied to guarantee this property However we
can abandon this assumption and use this property the fact that a com
munication channel may lose or invert its bits in favor of cryptography
For instance in the theoretical notion of Oblivious Transfer 	 
 it is
assumed that half of the bits transmitted by a party just disappear the
other party receives a  It has been proven that Oblivious Transfer is
sucient for obtaining a pmpc protocol   	 	  	
 More prac
tically Oblivious Transfer can be implemented on top of a Noisy Channel
 
 or on a Quantum Channel 

It turns out that most protocols represent the function f by a Boolean
circuit and they often exhibit the following overall structure
Initialization phase All participants agree on the circuit to be evaluated and
on all parameters of the protocol Some protocols use precomputations to
speed up the computation phase
	
Input phase Each participant provides its input in an encrypted way so as to
facilitate the private computation
Computation phase The participants evaluate the gates that constitute the
circuit sequentially and intermediate bits are encrypted in a way that no
body can learn their value
Revelation phase The participants decrypt and learn the output bits
The following security properties are of importance in a protocol for pmpc
Correctness when all participants are honest the output of the protocol is
the same as the function it is emulating
Privacy no coalition of n

participants can learn information about the input
of an honest participant if he does not cooperate except from what can be
deduced logically from the coalitions inputs and the output
Honesty no coalition of n

participants can make an honest participant accept
an output that is not equal to what it should be
Fairness participants should learn y ie no participant should be allowed to
learn the output and quit leaving the others without y
Resilience this reects the protocols ability to complete the computation of
f if several participants stop cooperating during the protocol
Clearly some of these properties are conicting like privacy and resilience
and tradeos have to be made like choosing the values for n

and n

 Coming
up with the right denitions for these security properties under the aforemen
tioned assumptions took much eort and has not been completely resolved
For instance dening privacy when the participants are computationally re
stricted is intrinsically dierent from the case where they are unrestricted The
fairness problem has been studied early 	
 and has been elegantly solved 

at least theoretically More recently people have come up with a general model
that tries to encompass all the various properties and assumptions   	

However with the advent of quantum protocols these models need more study
Yet another issue is the amount of resources needed 
 In other words one
can try to express and optimize the number of elementary operation protocol
rounds messages sent etc as a function of the input size circuit size the
number of participants the level of security desired etc
This concludes the brief overview of viewpoints to study protocols for pmpc
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to introducing one particular pro
tocol to evaluate an andgate taken from 
 This example was chosen be
cause the encrypted representation of the andgate is rather onetoone After
some necessary number theory has been introduced several simpler protocols
will be explained Apart from being interesting in themselves these protocols
introduce general protocol design principles that will be useful in explaining
the nal protocol
	
 The matchmaking protocol
 Some number theory
For the protocol presented here we need to recall some elementary facts from
number theory Let P be a prime number Then dene the Legendresymbol
L
P
a  a
P  

mod P  From now on we ignore the noninteresting case that a
is an integer multiple of P  It is wellknown that L is a homomorphism from
the multiplicative group Z

P
to f g Remember that a homomorphism
is a function that partially preserves the group operation In this particular
example we have L
P
a  b  L
P
a  L
P
b Here  denotes multiplication
modulo P and  denotes ordinary multiplication restricted to f g When a
homomorphism is onetoone it is called an isomorphism this means that there
are dierent ways to represent two sets but that they possess an identical group
structure We will follow the usual convention in mathematics of not writing
multiplicative algebraic operators explicitly except when clarity demands so
Euler proved that L
P
a   i x  Z  x

  a mod P  so the homomorphism
L partitions the domain Z

P
in two subsets called the quadratic residues resp
quadratic nonresidues modulo P  We often call x the square root of a where
the modulus here P  later N is understood from the context
From now on we set N  PQ with P and Q both prime Then the Chinese
Remainder theorem implies that the multiplicative group Z

N
is isomorphic to
the direct product of Z

P
and Z

Q
 Therefore it is perfectly meaningful to dene
the function J  Z

N
 f g J
N
a  L
P
aL
Q
a Surprisingly J
N
a
called the Jacobisymbol of a modulo N  can be computed very eciently
without knowing the prime decomposition of N 
In the remainder of this paper we will restrict ourselves to the elements of
Z

N
that have Jacobisymbol  so we write Z

N
  fa  Z

N
 J
N
a  g
By denition of J we nd that J
N
a   i L
P
a  L
Q
a   or L
Q
a 
L
Q
a   so Z

N
 is partitioned into quadratic residues and quadratic
nonresidues denoted as qr
N
and qnr
N
 respectively
Now we are ready to state the computational assumption on which the
protocol presented here is based It was rst stated and used by Goldwasser
and Micali see 
 for a more formal statement
Quadratic Residuosity Assumptionqra WhenN is the product of two primes
there exists no ecient algorithm to distinguish qr
N
and qnr
N
when the fac
torization of N is unknown
Note that an ecient algorithm for factoring N implies an ecient algo
rithm to distinguish qr
N
and qnr
N
compute the Legendresymbol L
P
a
but the reverse is not known to be true so qra is stronger than assuming
that factoring is hard Note also that we have discarded half of the elements
of Z

N
 namely those for which J
N
a   These elements are clearly all
nonresidues modulo N because either L
P
a   or L
P
a   but they
can play no meaningful role in the qra since their nonresiduosity can be
determined without factoring N by computing their Jacobisymbol J
N
a
		
 Representing bits by numbers
The preceding exercise in number theory gives us a natural representation for
bits a  corresponds to an arbitrary element in qr
N
 and a  corresponds
to an arbitrary element in qnr
N
 Moreover if z is known to be in qnr
N
 a
bit b  f g can be encrypted by picking a random r  Z

N
 and computing
e  Eb r  z
b
r

 all computations modulo N  Note that the product or
quotient of two encryptions belongs to the same class qr
N
or qnr
N
 as the
exclusiveor of the two original bits Eb
 
Eb

 mod N and Eb
 
b

 have
the same residuosity Here  denotes exclusiveor ie addition modulo 
From now on we suppose that Alice knows the prime decomposition of N 
and Bob doesnt Note that both can use the encryption function E but only
Alice can do the inverse decryption operation D Explicitly to decrypt e
Alice computes L
P
e and reinterprets the result from fg in f g So
this encryption scheme known as probabilistic encryption 
 can be used to
send messages from Bob to Alice It may seem very inecient but it has very
interesting theoretical properties
However throughout this paper we will not use E and D to establish secure
communication but to obtain a bit commitment scheme This cryptographic
primitive can be explained using an analogy with paper and envelopes In the
rst step of a bit commitment Alice say writes a  or a  on a piece of paper
puts the paper inside an envelope seals the envelope and puts it on the table
In the second step Alice opens the envelope and shows the number written on
the paper to Bob The point to observe is that once the envelope is sealed
Alice cannot change her mind on the bit but Bob does not yet know the bit
Surprisingly extremely powerful protocols can be constructed using just this
simple primitive A very simple example is a protocol known as coinipping
by telephone As the story goes 
 Alice and Bob are getting divorced and
want to divide their common belongings by ipping a coin They only speak
over the telephone or communicate by email but they do not trust each other
As can be easily veried the following protocol resolves their problem
Protocol    HonestCoinFlip 
  Alice chooses a random bit b   f g encrypts it using r and
sends eE b r to Bob
 Bob chooses a random bit b
 
  f g and sends it to Alice
 Alice sends b and r to Bob The value of the honest coin ip is bb
 

However before we can use E as a bit commitment scheme we must resolve
an important point A priori Bob has no reason to believe that N is indeed of
	
the form PQ that z is indeed a nonresidue modulo N  There are two ways to
resolve this point For the rst solution observe that if N has more than two
prime factors than at most
 

of the elements in Z

N
are quadratic residues So
Bob will be convinced that N has at most two prime factors if Alice shows that
a


fraction of a large collection of elements from Z

N
randomly chosen by Bob
are quadratic residues Here Alice and Bob must use ProveKnowRoot to
be introduced later
In addition Alice and Bob execute the following protocol from 
 to prove
that z  qnr
N
 The notation v 
R
S means that an element from the nite set
S is picked at random according to the uniform distribution and its value is
assigned to the variable v
Protocol   ProveQNRzN 
 Alice sends z to Bob
repeat k times
  Bob chooses b 
R
f g and r 
R
Z

N
  computes eE b r
and sends e to Alice
 Alice decrypts the message received b
 
D e and sends b
 
to Bob
 Bob accepts only if b 	 b
 

endrepeat
The point to observe is that if Alice cheats and chooses z  qr
N
 she only
receives quadratic residues in step  and has to guess b

 So in each round
a cheating Alice will be caught with probability
 

 which reduces to only
 

k
after k repetitions or rounds Often k is called the security parameter when the
amount of work increases linearly the probability for parties to cheat decreases
exponentially This is a generally accepted criterion for a protocol to be good
For an alternative way to verify that N and z are of the right form see the
protocol explained in 	

Given that z  qnr
N
both Alice and Bob can invert the value of a bit ie
implement a notgate by multiplying with z clearly Enotb   zEb In
the remainder of this paper   will be used to denote equality modulo N 
	 Showing equality of encryptions
Both parties can easily convince the other of the equality of two encryptions
e
 
 Eb r
 
 and e

 Eb r

 because their quotient or their product must
be a quadratic residue Eb r
 
Eb r


  
 z
b
r

 
z
b
r



  
 r
 
r
  



 So one
	
party can convince the other simply by opening r
 
r
  

mod N Of course
Alice can just decrypt two encryptions e
 
 Eb
 
 r
 
 and e

 Eb

 r

 created
by Bob and see whether they are equal or not But in some situations it can
be meaningful when Alice is convinced that Bob knows this fact too it proves
that Bob has constructed e
 
and e

using E instead of having them picked in
some sneaky way
Protocol   ProveEquale
 
 e

 N 
 Alice sends e
 
E b
 
 r
 
 and e

E b

 r

 to Bob
  Alice sends 
rr
 
r
 

mod N
 Bob accepts only if e
 
e
 

 
r


Obviously only minor modications of protocol ProveEqual are needed to
make a protocol ProveUnequal

 Intermezzo proving knowledge of a square root modulo N
It is important that in ProveEqual Alice never shows the square root on
something she has not created herself Moreover suppose Alice uses the fol
lowing insecure way to show to Bob that a number v is in qr
N
simply by
computing its square root w modulo N ie w

  v and sending w to Bob
Then with probability
 

Bob can nd the factorization of N  as follows Bob
sends v w

to Alice where w is chosen at random Then Bob receives a  w
such that v   w

 However v has two dierent square roots and with proba
bility
 

he nds w w

 Here we count the square roots w and w  N w
as one root since one can trivially be computed from the other But if Bob
learns two dierent square roots w and  w he can factor N simply by computing
the greatest common divisor of w   w and N  because w

   w

mod N
w   ww   w  tN w   w  t

P or w   w  t

Q for t t

 t

 Z
So what we really need is a protocol in which Alice convinces Bob that she
knows a square root w of v without showing w to Bob This is accomplished by
the following protocol  

The reader can easily verify that if v is not in qr
N
 Alice has a probability of
 

of being caught in each round since she has to be prepared for answering c  
and c   The protocol convinces Bob because Alices capacity to answer
both challenges simultaneously implies that she indeed knows w Secondly
notice that under the assumption that factoring is hard neither Bob nor a
third eavesdropping party Eve can learn w from the protocol because the only
time Bob receives something based on w it has been multiplied by a random
	
Protocol 	  ProveKnowRootvN 
 Alice has or creates w computes vw

mod N and sends v to Bob
repeat k times
  Alice chooses w 
R
Z

N
 computes v w

mod N and sends v to Bob
 Bob chooses a challenge bit c 
R
f g and announces c to Bob
 If c 	  then Alice sends t w Otherwise she sends tw w mod N 
 If c 	  then Bob accepts only if t

 v Otherwise he accepts
only if t

 vv
endrepeat
number which completely hides its value This special property of protocol
ProveKnowRoot called Zero Knowledge makes it perfectly suitable as a
basis for protocols for proofs of identity in which a client eg a PC a smart
card has to identify itself to a host a mainframe a bank 

Apart from being of interest in its own right this small digression allows
us to get acquainted with a general mechanism to design protocols called
cutandchoose named after the noncryptographic protocol in which two
children have to split a cake one cuts and the other chooses the biggest half
The general description of a cutandchoose is as follows Alice has or creates
an object O in ProveKnowRoot this is w which has a specic property P
namely w is a square root modulo N Let EO be an encryption of O Alice
would like to use EO but Bob wants to be sure that it satises
!
P the property
of encrypted objects that corresponds with P Therefore Alice creates a second
object
 
O encrypts it and sends it to Bob who can issue two challenges either
to verify that E
 
O is indeed the encryption of an object
 
O that satises P 
or to verify special relations between EO and E
 
O that conrm they both
satisfy
!
P  Cutandchoose is a very powerful technique dozens of protocols
use it and the protocol to evaluate an andgate is no exception
 Choosing white and red balls
Let us return to the encryption function E secure under qra By using per
mutations on several encrypted bits our abilities for making useful protocols
increases Consider the following problem Alice has a vase containing one
white ball and m   red balls and Bob is allowed to draw one ball The
following protocol emulates this procedure using E Let both b  f g
m
and
r  Z

N

m
denote vectors of length m Then Eb r denotes encryption of
	
the entries of b so its ith entry is of the form z
b
i
r

i
mod N  Furthermore if
S
m
denotes the group of permutations of length m and   S
m
 then b for
instance denotes the vector obtained by permuting the entries of b according
to  The composition of permutations is written from right to left
Protocol 
  PickABall 
 Alice encrypts bh   i   f g
m
using r 
R
 Z

N

m
 she chooses
  
R
S
m
and sends  E b r to Bob
repeat k times
  Alice does exactly the same as in step  using dierent random choices
for r
i
 
R
Z

N
   
R
S
m
 The result  E b

r is sent to Bob
 Bob chooses a challenge bit c 
R
f g and announces c to Alice
 If c 	  then Alice sends  and

r
Otherwise Alice sends 

 
and 
r
i
r
i
r
 

i
where i 	 m
 If c 	  then Bob checks that the m encryptions received in step 
indeed encrypt the vector b
Otherwise Bob checks that 
r

i
 r

i
r


i
where i 	 m
endrepeat
 Bob picks i 
R
f  mg
 Alice decrypts the ith component of  E b r ie
she sends b
j
and r
j
 where j
 
 i
	 Bob veries Alices decryption and learns whether he picked the white
 b 	  or the red ball  b 	 
Observe the notational conventions used the barred symbols created in step 
denote copies of the original objects created in step  whereas the symbols with
a tilde denote the quotients Furthermore note that apart from steps   and
 the protocol structure of PickABall is identical to ProveKnowRoot and
so are the reasons why the protocol is secure Indeed PickABall is another
example of a cutandchoose Observe that Bob only gets to see one entry
of b the other entries remain encrypted We could obtain a simpler protocol
if we were not so strict but the capacity to hide the other entries of b is of
great value as we will see Obviously this protocol can be easily generalized
	
to picking one or several balls from a set that contains k white and m k red
balls
 Blinding of encryptions
Another essential ingredient for the nal protocol is the blinding property
Suppose that in an earlier stage Bob has received two encryptions e
 
and e

from Alice Bob can reencrypt these encryptions using the function R dened
as e

 Re b

 r

  ez
b

r

mod N  where b

 f g and r

 Z

N
are chosen
randomly In the envelope analogy it is as if Bob is able to change the value
of the number written on the paper even though he does not know what the
number is In addition Bob replaces the old envelope with a new one Even
though this envelope is transparent to Alice she does not know which number
she originally put in the envelope
So if Bob sends the two reencrypted bits e

 
and e


back to Alice in random
order Alice is not able to determine the correspondence between the encryp
tions sent e
 
and e

 and received e

 
and e


 because of the randomly chosen
b

 
 r

 
 b


and r


 even though Alice is able to decrypt Obviously this tech
nique called blinding can be extended from two to any number of encryptions
e
i

In fact the blinding property allows us to run the protocol PickABall
with the roles of Alice and Bob reversed where Alice picks a ball Steps  to
 are copied from PickABall Thereupon Bob will use blinding as has just
been introduced Symbols that have a prime 

 will denote objects created by
Bob
 Evaluation of an andgate
After all these preparations the stage is nally set to discuss the protocol for
the matchmaking problem EvaluateAndGate We will represent an and
gate by a matrix so let T be a  	 	matrix that represents an andgate ie
T has rows h  ih  ih  ih  i We assume that the rst column
represents Alices input the second Bobs input and the third their common
output
The purpose of the full protocol is that Alice and Bob together create a
double encrypted version of T denoted T

 from which they can choose one
row that will correspond to their inputs so they both learn the output bit
after having decrypted the output bit for that column The output column will
be encrypted twice once by Alice and once by Bob The input columns are
encrypted once each party encrypts her or his input column
Steps  to  of EvaluateAndGate and ReversePickABall are very
similar except that the object to be encrypted is not a vector b but are 	 	
matrices W U and for Bob V Here W denotes T with some of its entries
xored as to hide the input and output columns using U and V We will
describe the protocol in three parts rst Alice creates an intermediate object
	
Protocol   ReversePickABall 
Steps  from PickABall are executed
Call  E b as received by Bob

b
 Bob reencrypts

b using b
 
and r
 
 he chooses 
 
 
R
S
m
and
sends 
 
 R 

bb
 
 r
 
 to Alice
repeat k times
 Bob does exactly the same as in step  using dierent random choices
for

b
 


r
 
 and 
 
 The result 
 
 R 

b

b
 


r
 
 is sent to Alice
	 Alice chooses a challenge bit c 
R
f g and announces c to Bob

 If c 	  then Bob sends 
 
and

r
 

Otherwise Bob sends 

 

 
 
 

 
and 
r
 
i
r
 

 
i
 r
 

 



i
where i 	 m
 If c 	  then Alice checks that the m encryptions received in step 
indeed encrypt the vector

b
Otherwise Alice checks that 
 
 R 

bb
 
 r
 
 and 
 
 E 

b

b
 


r
 
 are both
indeed permuted reencryptions of

b
endrepeat
  Alice picks i 
R
f  mg
   Bob undoes his reencryption by showing b
 
j
and r
j
 where
j 
 

 
 i
  Dene b


 
 R 

bb
 
 r
 
 Alice computes aD b

i
b
 
j
and learns
whether she picked the white or the red ball
b
T similar to
!
b in ReversePickABall then Bob creates T

 and nally
Alice and Bob open the output bit together
More precisely to start Alice creates
W  TU 

B
B

  
  
  
  

C
C
A


B
B

u
 

u

u
 

u

u
 

u

u
 

u


C
C
A
Here u
 
and u

are chosen randomly from f g and  means addition

modulo  of corresponding entries in the matrices The purpose of u
 
is to hide
Alices input and of u

to hide the output
Then Alice encrypts and permutes the rows ofW andU according to a per
mutation  
R
S

 Alice and Bob perform a protocol identical to PickABall
to prove that
b
T  EW is constructed as described above Here we have
dropped the random numbers r  Z

N
used in the encryption function E from
the notation
Protocol   EvaluateAndGate Construct
b
T 
 Alice creates WTU chooses   
R
S

 computes
 E W and  E U and sends them to Bob
repeat k times
  Alice does exactly the same as in step  using dierent random choices
for  
R
S

and for the rs used with E
The result  E W and  E U is sent to Bob
 Bob chooses a challenge bit c 
R
f g and announces c to Alice
 If c 	  then Alice sends  W and U and shows she encrypted them
honestly
Otherwise Alice sends 

 
and all the quotients needed for running
ProveEqual and ProveUnequal on the corresponding entries of
 E W  E U versus  E W  E U 
 If c 	  then Bob checks that the encryptions received in step  indeed
encrypt matrices W and U of the proper form
Otherwise Bob checks that  E W and  E U correspond to  E W
and  E U respectively
endrepeat
Now it is Bobs turn to take
b
T  EW and complete the construction of
T

 like in steps  to  from ReversePickABall Bob will do to
b
T something
identical to what Alice did to T however on encrypted bits Bob chooses a
matrix U

 hu


u


i to hide his input column and the output column He
also chooses an additional matrix V

 h hv

 
 v


 v


 v


ii Then Bob

computes W


b
T
EU


EV

 while using Alices encryption scheme
W



B
B

!
t
  
!
t
 
!
t
 
!
t
 
!
t

!
t

!
t
 
!
t

!
t

!
t
 
!
t

!
t


C
C
A



B
B


u


u



u


u



u


u



u


u



C
C
A



B
B

 
v

 
 
v


 
v


 
v



C
C
A
Here the boxes represent the fact that we are dealing with bits encrypted using
E while 
 represents multiplication moduloN of corresponding matrix entries
Bob will choose a permutation 

and send T

 

RW

 

E

U


and 

E

V

 to Alice E

denotes an encryption function that only Bob can
decrypt Bob must convince Alice that he has constructed T

honestly and to
that end they execute a protocol identical to step  of ReversePickABall
Now let us briey summarize what T

looks like both parties have permuted
the rows of T using  and 

 the output column is hidden by each party by
U and U

 and on top of that also blinded by V

 The input columns of T

are only hidden by one party the owner This enables the parties to nd the
output of the and on input x
A
from Alice and x
B
from Bob
In fact EvaluateAndGate implements much more than the simple match
making protocol
 Any logical gate can be implemented using this protocol
 Any number of participants can perform this protocol since any party can
join in and play the role of Bob
 Observe that V

is indispensable without it Alice is able to nd out which
permutation 

Bob has used EvaluateAndGate can be used with al
ternative choices for the encryption functions E in particular encryption
functions that Bob can decrypt In this case Alice instead of Bob needs to
encrypt the bits of the output column separately using a matrix V similar
to V

 For more details see 

 The protocol can be extended to evaluate any logical circuit consisting of
many gates T
i
 The only restriction is that when T
 
is connected to T


that the inversion bit used to hide the output column of T
 
be identical to
the inversion bit of the corresponding input column of T

 This is exactly
the reason why u

and u


were introduced they can hide intermediate
results when a circuit is evaluated In the case only one gate is evaluated
they are redundant Again for more details see 


Protocol   EvaluateAndGate Construct T


 Bob creates W
 

b
TE U
 
E V
 
 chooses 
 
 
R
S

 computes

 
 R W
 
 
 
 E
 
 U
 
 
 
 E
 
 V
 
 and sends them to Alice
repeat k times
 Bob does exactly the same as in step  using dierent random choices
for r
 
i
 
R
Z

N
 
 
 
R
S

 The result 
 
 R W
 
 
 
 E
 
 U
 
 
 
 E
 
 V
 

is sent to Alice
	 Alice chooses a challenge bit c 
R
f g and announces c to Bob

 If c 	  then Bob sends 
 
and W
 
 U
 
and V
 
 and
shows he encrypted them honestly
Otherwise Bob sends 

 

 
 
 

 
and all the quotients
needed for running ProveEqual and ProveUnequal 
 If c 	  then Alice checks that the encryptions received in step 
indeed encrypt matrices W U and V of the proper form
Otherwise Alice checks that 
 
 E W
 
 
 
 E
 
 U
 
 and 
 
 E
 
 V
 

correspond to 
 
 E W
 
 
 
 E
 
 U
 
 and 
 
 E
 
 V
 
 respectively
endrepeat
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Protocol   EvaluateAndGate Opening the output bit 
  Alice announces the indices for the two rows that correspond
to x
A
u
 
in the rst column of T


   From these two indices Bob announces the index of the row that
corresponds to x
B
u
 

in the second column Let us call this index i and
let j 
 

 
 i
  Bob opens E
 
 u
 

 and E
 
 v
 
j

  Alice opens E u

 and decrypts dD t

i

Then x
A
 x
B
du

u
 

v
 
j

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